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The Politics of Gender Concepts in Genetics
and Hormone Research in Germany,
1900–1940
Helga Satzinger
The history of biological understandings of sex difference and sex determination reveals
a surprising variety of conflicting views. In the first half of the twentieth century, notions
of a binary and discontinuous sex difference competed with more fluid concepts of a
binary order postulating the two poles of male and female connected by a continuum
of different stages of ‘intersexuality’. Genetic experiments laid the groundwork for
new claims that male or female organisms resulted from the combined effects of male
and female genetic factors with possible intermediate stages of ‘intersexes’. Following
a contrasting model in biochemistry, sex hormones were framed in a binary male-
female order despite contradictory experimental results. The results of genetics and
hormone research, moreover, entered into different political debates and struggles
around gender. Around 1900, for example, the supporters of gender equality used the
brand new theory of chromosomes’ crucial role in inheritance to argue for women’s
university education. In the 1920s and 1930s genetic concepts of sex determination
showed up in the conflicting debates about homosexuality, blurring gender norms,
degeneration, racial purity and miscegenation.
The history of these and other conflicting concepts reveals how deeply scientific
concepts were informed by political aims and desired or abhorred gender orders. These
concepts were never based on purely ‘scientific’ or experimental results alone. It is
not unusual for historians of science to find this sort of influence, as the construction
of knowledge is understood as a process of social negotiation in interaction with
the ‘Eigensinn’ (intrinsic logic) of the investigated objects, theories and experimental
systems used; it is deeply embedded in historical contingencies.1
My account of the politics of gender concepts in the history of genetics and
hormone research in Germany between 1900 and 1940 revises existing histories of
biological sex determination based on sources in the English language from the second
half of the twentieth century. These histories follow a narrative of a binary, masculinist
concept of sex determination in the 1950s, evolving into a more balanced concept by
the 1990s, a concept which finally transcends the binary. The evolution is seen as being
brought about by feminist and queer interventions.2 Going back to earlier decades of
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the century and to a different scientific arena, however, reveals a more nuanced and
contradictory historical process. There is no simple story of linear progress to tell, and
the story does not begin with a strictly binary, ‘two-sex-model’ of difference.3
By unravelling the politics of multiple gender concepts in the sciences of the early
twentieth century I hope to link the history of the scientific study of sex difference
with gender historians’ work on multiplicities of genders and their continuous renego-
tiation.4 Social history has shown convincingly how various gender orders have been
invented, explored and contested. So it should not surprise us that in the sciences as
well, there was not one and only one gender order at stake. As a historian of science
I investigate scientific concepts of sex difference as resulting from various social –
and gendered – processes, in which authority, power, responsibility and relevance are
attributed to scientists, scientific concepts and practices, to the choice of objects and
explanatory models. Taking my cue from gender history, whereby the meaning of
female and male is very malleable, I investigate the gendering of scientific objects or
concepts – such as sex difference, hormones, genes, chromosomes and germ cells. I
examine how these epistemic objects were shaped by and embodied political debates
about the gender order and how they, in turn, influenced them.
Sex/gender, nature/culture and Mother Nature’s ‘political correctness’
Let me first clarify two points related to the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, to prevent
possible misunderstanding. The use of the term gender is problematic, especially when
talking about biological understandings of sex difference.5 The German language
has one term for sex and gender, ”Geschlecht”, which does not distinguish between
the “natural” and the “cultural”. The English distinction between sex and gender, on
the other hand, often sets up a ‘natural’ or biological entity – ‘sex’– and leaves its
investigation to the sciences.6 However, feminist science studies showed that there
was no gender-free concept of biological ‘sex difference’ even before Judith Butler
pointed out the conceptual flaws of the sex-gender distinction.7 Writing in English on
biological concepts of ‘sex difference’ creates the problem of how to find a new term
for ‘sex’ to indicate that biologists also ‘do gender’ when investigating ‘sex difference’.
With no alternative at hand I will still use the terms ‘sex’, ‘sex difference’ and ‘sex
determination’ when I refer to scientists’ efforts to deal with what they see as the
nature of the difference between humans of different generative potential. I also want
to stress the point that we have no adequate terminology yet to describe and account
for the materiality of different bodies while avoiding the gendered assumptions of the
biological sciences. Even the biological constituents of the body, like ‘cells’, ‘genes’,
‘hormones’ and ‘chromosomes’ embody gendered concepts, which I hope to show.
The nature/culture and sex/gender conceptual divides create another problem.
During the last few decades feminist science studies have shown convincingly how
social concepts of gender shape scientific knowledge. Biology is a particularly striking
and obvious example as some of its topics deal with sex difference and sex deter-
mination, procreation, male or female behaviour and heredity, to name a few areas
where gender is an inevitable part of the process of knowledge production and knowl-
edge itself. Biology and medical sciences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
were crucial tools in the construction of knowledge about women’s nature and the
legitimation of their subordination.8 It was, and is, a very important task to deconstruct
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biological and medical concepts of gender which reiterate all too familiar sexist claims
about women’s difference from men, be it mathematical ability, orientation in space
or reproductive strategies. Based on the critical deconstruction of those gender con-
cepts, several authors in science and gender studies claim that ‘better science’ would
be possible once gender biases were removed. Once feminist perspectives prevail and
pose new questions, the argument goes, neglected topics could come to the fore, thus
restructuring and innovating knowledge for the better.9
However, there is a blind spot in this argument. It is based on a tacit and a very
old assumption, already used by women like Mary Wollstonecraft and Olympe de
Gouges in the late-eighteenth century: nature does not know a hierarchical gender
order.10 Today we still find the assumption lurking in feminist critiques that once
we investigate ‘nature’ in a gender-neutral way, we will find nature’s undistorted and
‘true’ properties. The natural world is posited as ‘politically correct’, waiting to be
discovered. Historians of science are usually more sceptical with regards to ‘scientific
facts’ of the natural world. For them, the investigative processes by which scientific
facts are ‘fabricated’ are the focus of attention. It is not really important, or at least
it should not be important, if those facts themselves meet the expectations of the
historian. But, is it really no problem, when ‘nature’ defies the feminist investigators’
political convictions with regard to the appropriate gender order? Usually the discovery
of ‘gender stereotypes’ in scientific concepts – whatever they might be – rings alarm
bells, indicating that something might be wrong with these scientific facts. But the
opposite case seems to go unnoticed. There is no alarm bell ringing when the scientific
fact meets a contemporary feminist norm of gender difference.
Three examples taken from the recent history of biology illustrate that the pre-
sumption of a ‘politically incorrect nature’ is rather unusual in feminist science studies.
Scott Gilbert and Karen Rader investigated the substantial participation of women sci-
entists in developmental genetics in the second half of the twentieth century. They
concluded that the prominent presence of women in this scientific discipline helped to
overcome masculinist assumptions and to come to a better, or more adequate, under-
standing of embryonic development.11 In a similar line of thought Sarah Richardson
argued that the influence of an outspoken feminist scientist led to investigating the
process of sex determination in humans in a new and more appropriate way in the
1990s.12 This scientific intervention was successful at this particular point in time as
the general social atmosphere encouraged the exploration of new gender concepts.
According to Richardson, the prevalent focus on male development and the neglect of
female development, as well as the belief in the normality of a strict binary order was
thus overcome by the end of the 1990s. Finally, in her 1996 paper ‘Gender and Geni-
tals’, Ruth Hubbard criticised the ‘[w]estern assumption that there are only two sexes’,
which ‘probably derives from our culture’s close linkage between sex and procreation’.
In her view, ‘this binary concept does not reflect biological reality’.13 To illustrate this,
she referred to various forms of ‘intersexes’ and societies where these ‘intersexes’
were regarded as normal human variants. In the Dominican Republic, for example,
some girls usually developed into young men during puberty. This transformation was
seen as normal by the villagers, whereas western scientists explained it as an effect
of a specific and pathological testosterone metabolism in individuals with a ‘male’
x-y chromosome status, preventing male development before puberty. In conclusion
Hubbard asked the medical profession ‘to remove their binary spectacles and, rather
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than explore what it means to be “male” or “female”, look into what it means to be
neither or both, which is what most of us are’.14 In Hubbard’s approach sex and gen-
der blur; people with all sorts of bodies assign themselves a particular social identity,
which is no longer framed in a binary sex/gender system. By doing so, she argued,
these people question their pathologisation of sexual indeterminacy by the medical and
biological professions. Hubbard’s example shows two ways of referring to ‘nature’.
On the one hand, there are people using the notion of pathology to posit a seemingly
natural order in which there are men and women only, with their clear-cut difference
defined by their reproductive potential. Variations are pathologies that demand medi-
cal intervention. On the other hand, there are people or cultures, including even some
scientists, which create and provide social spaces for all individuals who are there,
‘naturally’, by birth, without superimposing a binary gender order.15 The ethical foun-
dation of Hubbard’s approach follows the conviction that everyone born has the right
to exist, and medicine and science should not help to create social discrimination.16
According to Hubbard nature offers more than two sexes, therefore medicine and the
biological sciences should not impose a binary sex/gender order.
But, why should we refer to ‘nature’ to legitimate anti-discriminatory politics?
Can we assume that ‘nature’ is politically correct and prepared to help us against
discrimination? Is it just a matter of getting the sciences on the right political track
and then we will discover or ‘reinvent’ ‘nature’ as it is out there, happily, perfectly
compatible with our political convictions? Even if this were the case, I would argue
that we should not base our politics on the sciences.
‘Primatology is politics by other means’, Donna Haraway claimed provocatively
some years ago.17 Primatology is a contested scientific arena, where concepts of
human ‘nature’ and sex difference are developed. Haraway showed convincingly
how the successive intervention of female and feminist anthropologists changed the
gendered agenda and concepts of primatology and that they conceptualised more than
one gender order. But Haraway also showed that this feminist intervention remained
within the conceptual paradigm of sociobiology, and therefore, within the understand-
ing that our nature and ‘reproductive strategies’ simply reflect investment strategies in
a competitive, capitalist society. In a similar line of thought I wish to show how genetics
and endocrinology, in dealing with concepts of sex difference and sex determination,
developed not one but different gender orders which, in a highly contradictory way,
were part of the politics of their times. To support the claim that scientific concepts are
politics by other means, I will investigate what exactly was on the political agenda.
Gender politics in the sciences
I identify three arenas for examining the politics of gender concepts at work in genetics
and hormone research: the creation of scientific knowledge and its consequences for
the dynamics of the respective science, the use of scientific gender concepts in political
debates and the gendered organisation of scientific work, where women and men had
different tasks, duties and authority.18 In those three arenas of science, gender orders
were invented and negotiated, although we cannot assume a direct causality between
the gender order of the workplace, the knowledge produced and the politics supported.
The social gender orders did not translate directly into the scientific ones, and vice
versa. There was always tension, contradiction and asynchronicity. There were also
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specific disciplinary traditions, experimental systems and concepts, which incorporated
and perpetuated certain gender concepts. These concepts could not be overcome just
by changing the social gender order – at least in the short time frame of my study.
Moreover, a gender concept could act as liberating in one arena, while stabilising a
hierarchical order in another. This will be shown in more detail below.
My case studies come from zoological genetics and biochemical hormone re-
search in Germany, and in particular, from the work of two zoologists and one bio-
chemist and their male and female co-workers.19 Theodor Boveri (1862–1915), Richard
Goldschmidt (1878–1958) and Adolf Butenandt (1903–1990) were all key figures in
their scientific fields. Boveri is known even today for his identification of chromo-
somes as the sites of the inheritable units we now call genes. Goldschmidt was a
leading geneticist in the 1920s in Germany, who was both inspirational and contro-
versial. Butenandt became famous for the chemical isolation of ‘sex-hormones’ from
the late 1920s onwards. The three eventually reached the highest possible scientific
positions in Germany. Boveri acted in 1913 and 1914 as founding director of the
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute (KWI) for Biology; Goldschmidt became head of one of its
departments (1914–1935) and Butenandt became director of the KWI for Biochem-
istry in 1936, all in Berlin. They worked during times of dramatic political change:
from the time of the Empire (Boveri and Goldschmidt), to the Weimar Republic and
then National Socialism (Goldschmidt and Butenandt). Goldschmidt, who was Jewish,
was forced to emigrate in 1935–36 because of Nazi anti-Semitism, whereas Butenandt
was able to advance his career by active collaboration with the Nazi regime. He even
stayed at the top after 1945, when he became president of the Max Planck Society, and
he remained a leading figure in West German biomedical research until the 1970s.20
The early decades of the twentieth century also saw the feminist struggle for equality,
suffrage and economic independence; the decriminalisation of male homosexuality
and, confronting these movements, the anti-democratic and anti-feminist efforts of the
vo¨lkish and Nazi political movement that succeeded in 1933 with the establishment of
a totalitarian regime in Germany.
During these same years dramatic achievements occurred in the biological sci-
ences. With the rediscovery of Gregor Mendel’s laws of inheritance in 1900, genetics
developed as a new discipline. In 1905 Nettie M. Stevens (1861–1912) and Edmund
Wilson (1856–1939) proposed a new concept of sex difference as hereditary. It was
no longer believed to be nutrition or special circumstances during conception that
decided the sex of the offspring.21 Now genetic factors were seen as responsible for
the development of a fertilised egg cell into a male or female organism; observable
chromosomal difference could be correlated to sex difference, suggesting a causal
connection. In the 1920s hormone research approached the biological riddle of sex
difference by isolating and identifying those gonadal substances that could be seen as
responsible for the development of adult males or females.22
Things turned out to be rather complicated, and the binary either-or logic of sex
difference did not account for all the observations and experimental results. ‘Intersexes’
became part of the evolving theories of sex difference, which could range from minor,
irrelevant variations of the normal state to severe pathologies in need of surgical or
pharmaceutical intervention.23 As will be shown in more detail below, gender difference
became in a new way a matter of racial difference in the 1920s and a subject of normative
practices aimed against Jewish assimilation and Jewish-German marriages. Race and
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gender were not only analogous in their classifying powers, but also conceptually
interwoven. When sex hormones were first investigated, they were classified as male
or female, but soon they transcended the scientists’ attempts to order them. Female
hormones were found in male organisms; male hormones could have feminising effects
in experimental settings. Thus, they became ‘heterosexual’ hormones.24 The hormonal
gender trouble was severe, and the Dutch biochemist John Freud proposed in 1936
to abandon the classification of sex hormones completely and use the name ‘growth
promoters’ instead.25 However, despite this observed gender unruliness, there is no
convincing historiographic explanation of why the concept of male and female sex
hormones, with gender inscribed into their very names like oestrogen or prostaglandin,
has survived the twentieth century.
Gender at the workplace
Before going into more detail about these scientific developments, I will identify
elements of the gender order in the scientific workplace of the three research groups
around Boveri, Goldschmidt and Butenandt. All three cases belong to a time when
the model of the male breadwinner in heterosexual married couples was normative.
Earning their own living was acceptable for women only before marriage or in other
exceptional cases. In the first decade of the twentieth century, women were formally
admitted to university study in Germany, but a professional career in academia was a
rare exception for women; even today they have severe difficulties gaining influential
positions equalling those of men.26
In the decades covered here, women worked in all the research groups under
investigation. Their work was of crucial importance; however, the gender order in their
workplaces did not grant them equality. Theodor and Marcella Boveri (ne´e O’Grady,
1863–1950) were a binational married couple, both scientists with equivalent educa-
tions. Marcella Boveri stayed in her husband’s shadow, collaborating on experiments
and publishing only one paper on her own. Marcella came from the US where she had
teaching and research positions at Bryn Mawr and Vassar College. She had come to the
University of Wu¨rzburg to study for her Ph.D. with Theodor Boveri but married him
instead. She was the first woman to be admitted to Wu¨rzburg to study. The authorities
could not reject her as she had previous scientific training.
As Theodore Boveri’s wife, she was of importance not only as his collabora-
tor but also as a pioneering woman scientist, helping to open the university doors to
German women. Her success was a paradoxical one. She demonstrated that women
who had studied at universities did not necessarily compete with men on the job mar-
ket but potentially improved the career chances of their husbands if they worked in
the same field. The Boveris became important mentors and supporters of women’s
university education; they mentored nearly half of all women who earned a Ph.D. at
Wu¨rzburg before 1914. In addition, Boveri’s institute hosted several women scien-
tists from the US as visiting scholars, providing research opportunities that furthered
their careers at colleges in the US. Some of these women contributed substantially
to Theodor Boveri’s research by solving methodological problems relevant to his
approach. 27
The case of Richard Goldschmidt was different as he was not a professor at
a university. He offered opportunities to postdoctoral women scientists at his KWI
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department in Berlin where they could pursue research, but only one woman, Mathilde
Hertz (1891–1975), got a permanent paid position that lasted until her forced emigra-
tion in 1935–36.28 In his later years in the US, when Goldschmidt was older and less
powerful, women became his main collaborators.29 As one of the very few senior ge-
neticists of the 1940s and 1950s, he appreciated the work of maize geneticist, Barbara
McClintock (1902–1992), who, in 1983, was to be awarded the Nobel Prize for Phys-
iology or Medicine for her early work on transposable elements in the chromosomes.
This work challenged the leading genetic concepts of her time, but was not well re-
ceived. Both Goldschmidt and McClintock referred positively and supportively to each
other’s work in the 1950s, at times when he was highly controversial and she found
herself rather isolated in the scientific community.30 In his Berlin years Goldschmidt
had mostly relied on the support of women working in subordinate positions at the
institute – librarians, multilingual secretaries and technical assistants.31
In the early years of the twentieth century, the ‘technical assistant’ was established
as a new profession for women in the sciences and medicine in Germany. Technical
assistants had their own specific formal educational requirements and examinations
and worked in clinics, research laboratories, industry and governmental institutions.
Scientific work had started to require large-scale data production and processing. A
division of labour evolved which made an educated support staff necessary in science
laboratories. In this situation the new profession of ‘technical assistant’ met the needs
of scientists and of women who did not want to or were unable to invest a lot of
money in academic study. An academic education could not promise women secure
job prospects. Working as a technical assistant, however, gave women the opportunity
to earn a living before marriage or sustain themselves at a very modest level, if they
decided to or had to stay single, and they could work in the sciences without having
to compete with men for academic positions. Goldschmidt could draw on the work of
those women for his large-scale breeding experiments, for example, for the care of the
animals and for the collection and evaluation of the experimental data.
The biochemist Adolf Butenandt also needed the skills of female technical as-
sistants for the large-scale animal testing required for his hormone isolation projects.
He started his career and first efforts to isolate the female hormone with his later
wife, Erika von Ziegner (1906–1990), and several other women working as technical
assistants on the physiological tests. In his laboratories, there was a gendered division
of labour between male academic chemists and female technical assistants. For Bute-
nandt women clearly had to restrict themselves to supporting men, and there is ample
evidence that he could not tolerate independent women scientists.32
In all the cases covered, the gender order at the workplace was characterised by
the male head of the household and head of the institute or research group. Usually
women worked in a supportive position, either as the academically trained wife, the
Ph.D. student or the female technical assistant. Single women academics, in highly
precarious positions, collaborated with these groups, mostly for a short time. But,
basically, women did not become equals in scientific workplaces. The prevalence of
technical assistants even suggests that this new profession in German scientific research
helped to keep women out of academic training and to reduce the competition between
men and women on the academic job market. Despite these limitations, since around
1900 the gender order had gained a certain flexibility with regard to women’s education
and employment. During the Weimar Republic there was more openness to women’s
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independence and their pursuit of professional careers – one might even say there was
evidence of some sort of early gender bending. This limited experimentation ended
in 1933. The model of the male breadwinner in a heterosexual couple remained the
dominant model for the time investigated and far beyond.
Chromosomes and gender equality
In the late nineteenth century, until his untimely death in 1915, Theodor Boveri and
his wife Marcella investigated hereditary processes at the level of cells, which were
regarded as the smallest unit of a living organism.33 At centre stage was the investiga-
tion of the paternal and maternal contribution to the next generation. They investigated
which cellular material was transmitted and whether it was transmitted equally from
each parent. Consequently, cell division, the creation of germ cells, their fusion in fertil-
isation and the subsequent development of an organism became the objects of study. In
the nineteenth century August Weismann (1834–1914) and Ernst Naegeli (1817–1891)
had proposed the hypothesis that there must be a minute substance in every cell which
contained the plan for the whole organism, and which was transmitted via cell division
to the ‘daughter cells’.34 The problem was identifying the hereditary substances coming
from the paternal and maternal organisms. The Boveris used microscopy, staining tech-
niques and carefully designed experiments. Their model organisms were sea urchins
and the parasitic worm, Ascaris megalocephala. Both species had, in the eyes of the
zoologists, male and female forms and could serve as a model for the human case.
Within the cells certain stainable particles could be identified. They became
visible during cell division, were transmitted to the daughter cells but then disappeared
until the next cycle of cell division started. These particles – chromosomes – were
the perfect candidates to be identified as the heredity-bearing substance, as they are
still considered today. But careful investigation and experimentation was necessary
to prove that in every cell cycle the same number of chromosomes appeared in the
same form and that each of them had its own specific and irreplaceable relevance
for the normal development of an organism. In the years 1902–1904, shortly after
the rediscovery of the Mendelian laws of inheritance, Theodor Boveri identified the
chromosomes as the material entity on which Mendelian ‘Anlagen’ – later called
genes – were situated. He saw the chromosomes as the crucial substance of heredity,
which always in pairs, were passed on from one cell generation to the next. One set of
the pair came from the maternal organism and one from the paternal organism via their
egg cell or spermatozoon, respectively, which had fused during fertilisation. Boveri’s
interpretation was later called the chromosomal theory of heredity and became one
of the building blocks of the science of genetics. Chromosomes are today seen as
containing the substance DNA, which carries the genes that, by coding for proteins
and their regulation, supposedly determine every organism and its function.
A precondition for the identification of the chromosomes as the hereditary material
was a new interpretation of fertilisation as the fusion of two morphologically and
functionally different germ cells, the ‘female’ egg cell and ‘male’ spermatozoon. In
1902 Theodor Boveri described fertilisation with a special focus on the movements
and distribution of chromosomes. He could show that the spermatozoon contributed
chromosomes only to the next generation.35 The chromosomes of the paternal and
maternal cells joined in pairs, and Boveri initially believed in the complete equality of
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the two sets of chromosomes in terms of shape, size and function. It was only some
years later that new findings on chromosomal sex determination made him change his
mind.
Around 1900 evolutionary thought and the view that cell division was the pri-
mordial mode of reproduction created a problem: the existence and function of the
male spermatozoon was in need of explanation. Theodor Boveri came to a conclusion,
which, curiously enough and in one respect only, resembles a rather recent interpreta-
tion of the evolutionary position of the y-chromosome, now usually understood as the
chromosome characterising male mammals.36 According to Boveri, in early evolution
the primordial cell was characterised by its ability to divide into two ‘daughter’-cells.
The next step in evolution was the fusion of two cells forming a new organism. Then,
those cells that aggregated into colonies or ‘families’ of sixteen cells differentiated
by size and thus formed primordial germ cells, with the smaller one becoming the
prototype, so to speak, of the male and the larger one of the female germ cell. From
this evolutionary step onwards, the ‘male’ spermatozoon was in a process of contin-
uous miniaturisation, until it contained only chromosomes. The chromosomes were
the only material necessary for the ‘male’ role in reproduction; they guaranteed the
spermatozoon’s and the male’s further existence in producing the variability of the
next generation. Basically, even until today, the production of variability is seen as the
reason why heterosexual reproduction has evolved. Why the primordial ‘maternal’ cell
produced different offspring in the first instance was, however, neither questioned nor
explained by Boveri. Evolutionary progress, differentiation and variation of and within
species became dependent on the ‘invention’ of the male and sexual reproduction; with
this hypothesis, the spermatozoon (and the male) gained its relevance.
The hereditary process – in the heterosexual model – was conceptualised around
the equality of the paternal and maternal contribution: the chromosomes of the germ
cells. An array of hypotheses and experimental findings was necessary to stabilise this
equality claim. Their behaviour during cell division, germ cell formation, fertilisation
and embryonic development made the chromosomes the ideal cellular component
to harbour the newly rediscovered hereditary factors, which followed the Mendelian
laws. And, the Mendelian laws of inheritance also postulated – per assumption and
experimental design – the equal contribution of male and female parent. The gene
as the elementary unit of heredity was conceptualised within this framework which
excluded a priori a possible maternal inheritance transmitted via the cytoplasm.
But, proving equality was a tricky problem at the level of the gendered germ
cells. First there was the undeniable morphological size difference: the spermatozoon
contributed only chromosomes to the next generation, whereas the egg cell contributed
chromosomes and the cytoplasm, which contained all the substances needed for the
cell’s function, division and subsequent differentiation. Even more, this female cy-
toplasm was active – it reorganised the chromosomes during ontogenesis.37 For the
process of cell differentiation during ontogenesis, a mechanism was needed which
guaranteed that only certain parts of the hereditary material, that is parts of the chro-
mosomes, were present in different cell lines so that they could differentiate into
muscles, nerve or liver cells, etc.38 According to Boveri’s and his female co-workers’
findings in the years between the late 1880s and 1910, the cytoplasm reorganised
the chromosomes during ontogenesis.39 In the germ line, however, the chromosomes
were not affected by plasmatic activity; here, following Weismann’s germ line theory,
C© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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the hereditary material was transmitted unchanged to the next generation of organ-
isms. This assumption guaranteed that male influence to the next generation equalled
the female, and it made the findings about the chromosomes compatible with the
new experimental approaches of Mendelian genetics. But, Boveri could not propose a
mechanism by which the ‘female’ cytoplasm stayed inactive in the germ line.
In Boveri’s work, the two gendered germ cells were seen as mutually dependent
on each other.40 There was no conflict of different reproductive strategies as current
biological thought assumes. Around 1900, the tendency to perform cell division was in-
hibited in both the egg cell and in the spermatozoon when apart. Both cells needed each
other to guarantee procreation, which was regarded as the raison d´eˆtre of all life forms.
However, there were contemporary observations and experiments on parthenogenesis,
according to which the egg cell could start dividing and developing into a full-grown
organism, without fusing with a spermatozoon. Due to its lack of cytoplasm, however,
the spermatozoon was very unlikely to divide into two cells and start procreation on
its own. A gendered difference remained.
Genetic concepts in Boveri’s work were thus gendered at several levels: with the
help of the gendered germ cells, and the use of heterosexual procreation as the model for
all hereditary processes, the cell and its components were ordered by gender. The ‘fe-
male’ egg cell contributed chromosomes and cytoplasm and the ‘male’ spermatozoon
contributed chromosomes to the next generation. Therefore, only the chromosomes
could guarantee a paternal contribution to heredity equalling the maternal. Identifying
the chromosomes as the definitive hereditary substance ensured gender equality (rather
than female preponderance) in the process of inheritance. The paternal contribution
matched the maternal only if the cytoplasm was deemed irrelevant in heredity.
The cytoplasm became female and subordinate. Within the cell a gendered hier-
archy was established. In Boveri’s work the cytoplasm was still powerful and active,
but only during the embryonic development of the organism. Here was the realm of
female influence, which could be framed in the classic notion of nutrition, care and
guidance.41 The cytoplasm did not contribute hereditary traits to the next generation.
Only the chromosomes were seen as the cellular units, which could ‘imprint’ hered-
itary properties onto the cell and organism. Symbolically, the chromosomes became
male, even though both egg and sperm contained them. For the following decades,
this hierarchical gendered order of the cell and hereditary processes created a blind
spot for genetics, which focused on the genes in the chromosomes only. Processes of
cytoplasmatic organisation of the ‘hereditary substance’ have since slowly come back
into focus under the name of epigenetics. The older concepts of the gene as the only
determining physical unit in the DNA can now be questioned in a new way.42 However,
this is not necessarily the consequence of a clandestine feminist revolution brought
about by a ‘better, gender conscious approach’ in genetics. It is simply the result of
new capacities to calculate and model complex interactions of molecular components
of the chromosomes and cytoplasm of the cell.
Interactive or hierarchical binary?
In Boveri’s last publication the chromosomes were not perceived as the all-powerful
entities controlling the cell and the organism. There was always collaboration and
interdependence between the chromosomes and the cytoplasm, especially during
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development. But this understanding did not become mainstream in genetic research
and thought.43 The investigation into heredity was reduced to cross-breeding experi-
ments in the search for genes on chromosomes. For this approach Thomas Hunt Mor-
gan’s (1866–1945) research group, which started their chromosome mapping project
with the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster in 1911, became particularly important.
The model organism Drosophila was not as well-suited to investigating the interac-
tion of chromosomes and cytoplasm, as Boveri’s sea urchins were. But, cross-breeding
Drosophila allowed for the establishment of a theory of the gene as sites on the chromo-
some.44 This new experimental approach was highly productive; it created a dramatic
momentum and came to dominate zoological genetics. With genetics evolving, an ini-
tially cooperative binary gender order was transformed into a hierarchical and asymmet-
ric one; it was transformed into a classic dualism, where one part of the two – the chro-
mosome (and after 1953, the DNA) – became the active representative of the whole cell
or organism, whereas the cytoplasm became the subordinate female and passive other.45
There is an irony to this story. The new genetic gender equality, established
with the help of the chromosomes to safeguard men’s equal contribution to the next
generation, was used in other realms such as political efforts to gain women’s equality.
In the early decades of the twentieth century, female doctors and geneticists, and also
male geneticists, even argued in favour of women’s admission to universities based on
the new results of genetics. Women, they argued, could no longer be seen as inferior;
they inherited half of their faculties from their fathers – as did their brothers.46
Chromosomes and the binary, inheritable sex difference
The identification of chromosomes as the hereditary material had another effect on
biology. The chromosomal theory of heredity became the basis for the new genetic
interpretation of sex difference in 1905 by Nettie M. Stevens and Edmund Wilson.47
Wilson was an old friend of the Boveris, and Stevens had worked in Boveri’s laboratory
shortly before she proposed the new interpretation. Both had first hand knowledge of
the work on chromosomes as hereditary material. In the case of insects, a difference in
the number or size of the chromosomes could be correlated with the difference between
male and female organisms. Depending on the species chosen for investigation, two
types of germ cells could be identified which differed in the amount of chromosomal
substance they transmitted; either the size or the number of chromosomes differed
between them. In most of the species investigated, two types of spermatozoa were
present; in some species two types of egg cells were produced. Male and female
offspring were now viewed as the result of an accidental combination of germ cells
and their chromosomes during fertilisation. Sex difference became genetically based
and binary, an either-or difference.
With this new interpretation men and women could be seen as binary alternatives.
Some could see them as equals; for others there was still the possibility to see men as the
fully developed version of man and women as the lesser one. But the important novelty
was that being a man or a woman could now be seen as the result of a chromosomal
lottery with women getting forty-eight and men getting forty-seven chromosomes.48
The new theory of chromosomal sex determination had another considerable advantage
for women in the asymmetric gender order of the time: women could no longer be
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held responsible if they gave birth to girls only. Now they could claim that ‘boy or girl’
depended on the actual chromosomal constitution of the ‘male’ spermatozoon, which
took part in fertilisation. The father ‘decided’ on the sex of the child.
The new binary concept of chromosomal sex difference became crucial for
Morgan’s above-mentioned gene mapping project, which produced the first theory
of the gene as discrete units in a linear arrangement on the chromosomes. In this
respect the concept was highly productive, while it also helped to stabilise the binary
gender order within the cell. But, it also created a new problem for biology as older
embryological concepts of sex difference could not be incorporated into genetics. Em-
bryology was based on studies in comparative anatomy in the nineteenth century that
saw sex difference as the result of development from a primordial, bisexual embryo. In
this older view, all organisms had a bisexual potential, whereas the new genetic model
based on chromosomal difference postulated a binary either-or sex difference from the
moment of fertilisation.
‘Intersexes’ – reconciling sex difference in embryology and genetics
Richard Goldschmidt, a member of the same German research community as Boveri,
was successful in developing a genetic interpretation of sex determination compatible
with embryological concepts.49 In 1913 he started cross-breeding experiments to in-
vestigate the new heredity of sex difference. He used various geographic populations
– or ‘races’ in the terminology of taxonomists – of the gypsy moth Lymantria dispar
prevalent in Europe and Japan. Certain combinations of different populations resulted
in offspring which no longer showed clear signs of being male or female, such as wing
pigmentation or size and morphology of the antennae. Goldschmidt termed these spec-
imen ‘intersexes’. He claimed that he could produce all stages of intersexes between
male and female by choosing the appropriate populations for his experiments. He pos-
tulated the existence of male and female genetic factors, which were responsible for sex
determination within one organism. Male and female organisms would have both male
and female genetic factors situated on the chromosomes and in the cytoplasm. Their
mixture, strength and the timing of activity determined male or female or intersexed
identity.50 Goldschmidt refined his model in the 1920s and succeeded in reconciling
the newer genetic and older embryologic concepts of sex determination. According to
his interpretation every individual organism and even each of its cells had the potential
to develop in the male or female direction, with all intermediate stages possible. In
Goldschmidt’s model, masculinity and femininity were not two exclusive binary pos-
sibilities, but rather admixtures.51 There was no pure masculinity or femininity: each
‘Geschlecht’ (sex), according to Goldschmidt, was a mixture of both ‘Geschlechter’
(sexes), with one of the two prevailing.
Goldschmidt started to refer to his findings in the context of political debates
about male homosexuality and hermaphroditism during the First World War. Joining
his colleagues from sexology, such as Magnus Hirschfeld (1868–1935), he argued in
favour of the decriminalisation of homosexuality as one of many natural ways of being.
Hermaphrodites should not be assigned one of two sexes, as they simply did not fit
into those categories. Goldschmidt’s genetic model of sex determination allowed him
to formulate this novel view. However, even this argument still had the potential to
pathologise extreme forms of intersexuality, and it could still incorporate a claim of
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male dominance. The crucial, and at his time highly controversial point was that there
was no femininity-free masculinity: each sex contained elements of the other.
Goldschmidt’s right-wing and vo¨lkish colleagues found ways to use his scientific
work for completely different political ends in the 1920s. They took his results from
the cross-breeding experiments as scientific foundation for their antisemitic and anti-
feminist political agenda by arguing for the preservation of the racial purity of the
Nordic race and of a strictly binary gender order. The racial hygienist Fritz Lenz (1887–
1976) was one of the key figures in this process. He later became a leading human
geneticist of the Nazi era, when he was appointed head of department for eugenics at
the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity and Racial Hygiene
in Berlin. After 1945 he was appointed the first professor of human genetics in West
Germany.
Lenz was an ambitious young medical doctor and dedicated to the project of racial
hygiene. He started his career in 1912 with a Ph.D. about the sex-linked inheritance
of diseases in men and sex determination. Subsequently he worked within the theo-
retical paradigm Goldschmidt had established. He even cross-bred specimens of the
moth Lymantria dispar to investigate sex determination and the creation of intersexed
animals.52
For Lenz and his vo¨lkish colleagues, the Nordics or Aryans were the most highly
developed race. They were characterised by the most pronounced physical and mental
difference between men and women, which was marked politically by their difference
in their legal status. Lenz saw the blurring of a clear binary human gender order, as
it unfolded in the years of the Weimar Republic, as a dangerous sign of racial degen-
eration. Using the results of Goldschmidt’s cross-breeding experiments, Lenz claimed
that miscegenation (‘Rassenmischung’ or even ‘Rassenschande’) was the genetic cause
for this process. As Germany no longer had colonies after 1919, miscegenation was
mainly seen as occurring in the marriages between so-called Aryans and people of
Jewish descent. During the later years of the German Empire, the idea had circulated
already that German-Jewish marriages caused degeneration by effeminising men and
masculinising women, thus leading to the decline in birth rate and weakening the State.
This trope had become a key element of antisemitic, anti-democratic and anti-feminist
political thought before the First World War.53 In the 1920s, science, and especially
genetics, could be used to support it. According to Lenz and his allies, the highly visible
New Woman of the Weimar republic, female suffrage and the efforts to invent new
gender orders beyond the heterosexual matrix of strict binaries could be understood
as a genetic process of degeneration. Marriage bans were argued to be the necessary
consequences; they were first put in place with the Nuremberg laws in 1935. This was
the point at which Goldschmidt found himself legally classified as Jewish, deprived of
his German citizenship; his children faced marriage bans.
Goldschmidt’s genetic concept of sex determination and its experimental founda-
tion were used for opposite political agendas: in favour of diversity in gender and
sexual orientation and in support for racist and anti-feminist efforts. For genetic
research, the case was different. Lenz did not use Goldschmidt’s gene concept, which
was based on the study of the inheritance of sex difference. In Goldschmidt’s view
genes did not necessarily cause the same phenotype under all circumstances. Like the
genetic factors for masculinity and femininity, all genetic factors had to be conceptu-
alised as differing in ‘strength’; they were not stable and independent of their context.
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This concept of the gene was unacceptable for Lenz and his colleagues who aimed
at a new genetics-based racial anthropology. They needed a gene concept where the
gene was reliable and always produced the same effect. Otherwise racial traits would
not necessarily reappear in following generations; racial difference would blur like
sex difference, especially in a case of ‘miscegenation’. Goldschmidt’s genes not only
made the two sexes rather fluid and connected by a continuum of intersexes, they were
also not suitable to guarantee the stable inheritance of racial characters. Consequently,
Lenz rejected Goldschmidt’s gene concept, but he used some results of Goldschmidt’s
experiments for the scientific foundation of his political concepts of a social order,
which demanded clear distinctions and hierarchies between men and women or people
classified as members of different races.
Sex hormones and the binary again
A third experimental and conceptual approach to the problem of sex determination
was the search for ‘sex hormones’ and their function in the organism of vertebrates.54
The German biochemist Adolf Butenandt started the search for sex hormones in mam-
mals and humans in the mid-1920s in collaboration with his future wife and technical
assistant, Erika von Ziegner. At that time he was a young biochemist at the Univer-
sity of Go¨ttingen whose work was supported by the Berlin pharmaceutical company,
Schering-Kahlbaum.55 Contemporary endocrinologists and biochemists used a binary
model of sex difference; male hormones were seen as antagonists of the female hor-
mones.56 This model was based on the assumption that the male or female gonads
produced the respective hormones that determined the sex of the organism. Castra-
tion experiments had shown that without gonads the sex characters of the organism
disappeared. Substituting for lost gonads by implanting gonads or injecting gonadal
extracts could reconstitute these sexual characters. Testes were seen as the production
site of male hormones, and ovaries as the origin for female hormones. Many disciplines
competed in the research on these substances, which promised to become powerful
tools as drugs, once they could be chemically isolated and identified. Biochemists,
physiologists, gynaecologists, embryologists and others used gonadal extracts or urine
for their experiments, which led to controversial results and once again challenged the
initial assumption of a binary order of female and male hormones.57 Male organisms
could produce female hormones and male hormones could be transformed into female
hormones and vice versa in the biochemical laboratory. As soon as synthetic hor-
mones could be produced in large quantities in the mid-1930s, experiments proved the
feminising effects of supposedly male hormones and the masculinising effects of sup-
posedly female hormones.58 The seemingly simple categorisation of these hormones
into male and female had become questionable.
Butenandt is especially interesting to investigate in this context because we can
see clearly how he preserved the initial hormonal gender order, leaving it unchanged
in the face of contradictory experimental evidence. Starting with the assumption of a
binary order of the hormones, he isolated a ‘female’ hormone (named Progynon) in
the late 1920s, and in collaboration with his assistant Ulrich Westphal, a corpus lutem
hormone responsible for pregnancy in the early 1930s (Progesterone); he completed the
hormonal set with the isolation of a hormone identified as male (Androsterone). In 1939
he was awarded ‘the Nobel prize in Chemistry for the work on the sex hormones’.59
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To identify the chemically isolated hormones as male or female and to iden-
tify their efficacy, specially designed animal tests were needed. These animals were
transformed into instruments of measurement. They received injections of hormonal
extracts, and then the effects on certain tissues helped to identify the extract con-
taining the most effective hormone. Female hormones could be seen by their effect
on the vaginal tissue of castrated mice, whereas the comb growth of capons, mea-
sured in millimetres, indicated the effects of the male hormone.60 Butenandt was
not interested in the physiology of the hormones; his experimental approach was not
suited to understanding their role in sex determination during development. He was
in search of a drug and focused on the identification and isolation of substances.
He pursued the crystallisation of male and female hormones as those substances that
proved to be the most effective in his experimental settings. By design, the experi-
ments merely confirmed the existence of male or female hormones as expected. The
isolated and later synthesised substances were to be sold as medication – to compensate
for gendered frailties, be it weakening physical or mental features of masculinity or
femininity.
With hormones available in pure form and larger quantities, new experiments
showed the paradoxical effects of the supposedly male or female hormones even in
Butenandt’s laboratory. Despite his own and other scientists’ results he continued
to identify all sex-related hormones as male, female or pregnancy hormones, even
as late as the 1950s. His perseverance is even more striking, as he could have used
Richard Goldschmidt’s model of sex determination according to which a mixture of
male and female sex-determining substances, in combination and respective balance,
determines the organism’s male and female physical features. Indeed, Goldschmidt
had integrated the new biochemical findings on the sex hormones (by Butenandt and
others) into his model of sex determination by the late 1920s, but Butenandt did
not refer to Goldschmidt’s model.61 In 1936 Butenandt nearly became the colleague
of Goldschmidt, when he took up the position as the Director of the Kaiser Wilhelm
Institute for Biochemistry in Berlin, whose former Jewish director Carl Neuberg (1877–
1956) had been sent into forced retirement.62 In the same year Goldschmidt was himself
forced to emigrate, and he lost his citizenship and the position as head of department
at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Biology. Both institutes were neighbours in the
Berlin suburb Dahlem; Butenandt and Goldschmidt belonged to the same prestigious
scientific community, which had, however, excluded its Jewish members by 1936.
It is apparent that there were political reasons why Butenandt did not accept
Goldschmidt’s model. The model of every higher organism being a mixture of male and
female characters had ultimately become branded a ‘Jewish model’. By the mid 1930s
it was mostly Jewish scientists, now in emigration, who developed and used it. The
model was not compatible with Butenandt’s right-wing, vo¨lkish concept of masculinity,
which had to be pure and not ‘contaminated’ by feminine features. Butenandt persisted
with his concept; there was no more scientific opposition to fear, and in the political
situation of the time, his model was deemed politically correct.
But, even without these political motives, it would have been difficult for Bu-
tenandt to give up his model and change his experimental approach. Such a change
would have meant giving up the leading role as a biochemist, crystallising and iden-
tifying organic substances, and handing scientific leadership over to physiology or
embryology where the development of sex difference in organisms could be studied
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with different methods and concepts. He did not do this. Instead, his solution was to
give up research on hormones by the mid 1930s and look for a new epistemic object.
He continued with his experimental approach, which henceforward aimed at the iden-
tification and crystallisation of other ‘active principles’ as chemical agents. He and his
research group focussed on genes and viruses and other highly powerful substances
and tried to identify them chemically.63
Conclusion
The Butenandt case clearly shows how political reasons encouraged the acceptance
and rejection of a particular scientific model of sex differences. It also shows that there
were constraints within particular disciplinary traditions and experimental systems,
which made a change of approach extremely difficult for the scientists involved. The
blunt pressure of politics increased Butenandt’s power within the scientific community
and also shielded him from criticism. The combination of all these factors added
to the stabilisation within German science of a concept of sex difference and sex
determination, which could have been challenged by a different disciplinary approach
existing in principle at the time. But virtually no powerful research group with the
appropriate support or funding existed.
In the works of Boveri and Goldschmidt, experimental settings and commitments
to disciplinary traditions also set the stage for the gender concepts possible in ge-
netics. This material and practical framework is important in explaining why certain
concepts were developed and applied. These concepts sometimes moved in oppo-
site directions: an equality claim at the level of germ cells’ chromosomes stabilised
a gendered hierarchy within the cell and the gendered agenda of genetics. The new
chromosomally determined sex difference had the same effect, and it disconnected
genetics from embryology at a key point. If we include among explanatory factors
the political salience of the different models, things become even more complicated:
the equality claim at the level of the chromosomes helped to support a new notion
of male equality in reproduction, which countered a perceived superiority of women.
However, in politics this new genetic equality could be used to argue in favour of
women, who had not reached political, social, legal and economic equality with men.
Research on chromosomal sex determination could be called upon to protect women
from blame when they gave birth to a child of the wrong gender, but it also supported
the notion of a binary, discontinuous sex difference. The concept of a sex difference
as proposed by Goldschmidt defined intermediate stages between male and female as
natural and reconnected embryology and genetics. The political uses of these findings
again encompassed opposite tendencies – liberalisation on the gender/sexuality front
and support for racist, antisemitic and anti-feminist politics.
Is there a personal component to this political pattern? Do the individual scien-
tists matter when certain experimental systems and disciplinary traditions of thought
have their own dynamics, when scientific work determines which (scientific) gender
concepts can be developed and used? Do scientists’ personal gender-political convic-
tions count at all? The era in question here saw political debates on gender difference,
moves toward political and educational equality, challenges to a binary, hierarchical
gender order and also efforts to reinstall it. At the social level there was no hegemony
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of gender concepts; nevertheless, the general framework of male dominance was not
fundamentally transformed. However, I think it makes sense to assume that the choice
of scientific questions and experimental approaches is not arbitrary. Scientific fields
are fields where authority, respect and power are distributed in rather uneven ways.
Therefore gender orders are part of this field as well. The choice of a particular dis-
ciplinary field and approach by a particular person may well depend on the tolerance
and freedom offered by the members of this field with regards to possible gender
orders. This may contribute to the connections between the social gender order at the
scientific workplace and the scientific gender orders developed in this place – it is a
loose, contradictory and very dynamic relationship, and not a simple causal one.
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